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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee, 
vs. 
ALLEN G. TENWOLDE, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 950406-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction properly lies in the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to § 78-2A-3(2)(f), U.C.A., as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue Presented: 
Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that the 
prior decision of the Drivers License Division (the "division") to 
take no action regarding the defendant?s/appellantfs driver's 
license for driving under the influence of alcohol constitutes 
jeopardy of punishment, thus barring a second prosecution for 
driving under the influence of alcohol under § 41-6-44, U.C.A., 
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution, and 
Article One, Section 12, Utah State Constitution. 
Standard of Review: 
The decision of the trial court was based upon an agreed set 
of facts. Therefore, the issue before this court involves review 
of the trial court's determinations of law. Such matters are 
reviewed under a "correctness" standard, wherein the "appellate 
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any 
degree to the trial judgefs determination of law." State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
Preservation of Issue for Review: 
The issue presented was preserved for appellate review 
pursuant to a plea of guilty to a class B misdemeanor. The plea 
was taken under Rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
conditioned upon the defendant (hereinafter referred to as 
"appellant") being allowed to appeal the prior decision of the 
court denying appellant's Motion to Dismiss asserting the issue of 
double jeopardy, pursuant to stipulation (R. 132) and court order 
dated June 22, 1995 (R. 134). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
A. The following constitutional provisions have direct 
application in this matter. 
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The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury 
. . . nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. . . . 
The Utah State Constitutional provision, Article One, Section 
12, likewise states in pertinent part: 
. . • nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
B. Statutory Provisions, copies of which are appended hereto 
are as follows: 
Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 53-3-223, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 53-3-227, Utah Code Annotated 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the decision of the trial court denying 
appellant's Motion to Dismiss asserting the issue of double 
jeopardy (R. 120). 
The claim of double jeopardy is based upon the fact that prior 
to the criminal prosecution in the Third Circuit Court the 
appellant had appeared for the purpose of a "per se" hearing before 
the Drivers License Division regarding suspension of the 
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appellant's driver's license pursuant to § 53-3-223, U.C.A. As a 
consequence of the "per se" hearing, the division determined to 
"take no action" and not suspend the appellant's driver's license 
(R. 47-50). 
Subsequent to the division's action but prior to the scheduled 
trial date the appellant moved to dismiss the prosecution in the 
Third Circuit Court based upon grounds of double jeopardy, 
asserting that the "per se" hearing amounted to jeopardy upon a 
first prosecution thereby barring a second prosecution for the same 
offense pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article One, Section 12, Utah State Constitution. 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss (R. 28), supported by memorandum (R. 
30). 
On or about April 29, 1995 the trial court issued its Decision 
on Motion to Dismiss, denying the motion (R. 120). Thereafter, 
pursuant to stipulation, the appellant entered a plea to Count I of 
the Information as amended, driving under the influence of alcohol 
pursuant to § 41-6-44, U.C.A., a class B misdemeanor, said plea 
being conditioned upon reservation of the right of appellant to 
appeal the decision of the court with respect to the issue of 
double jeopardy, entered on or about April 18, 1995, pursuant to 
Rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and State v. Montoiia. 
887 P.2d 857 (Utah 1994). (Stipulation, R. 132; Order, R. 134.) 
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This stipulation and order merely acknowledge and further 
memorialize the proceedings before the court as indicated in the 
docket entry of May 26, 1995, ". . . Def COP pursuant to State v 
Sery. . . . " (R. 142). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following statement of facts is taken from appellant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 30-91). The State 
stipulated to the facts as set forth therein (R. 94). 
In or about October 8, 1994 the appellant was arrested in Salt 
Lake Count by a Salt Lake County Sheriff's Deputy and cited for 
driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to § 41-6-44, 
U.C.A. Pursuant to said citation, the appellant was given notice 
of intent to suspend his Utah driver's license pursuant to § 53-3-
223, U.C.A., by the Department of Public Safety, Drivers License 
Division (R. 44). 
On or about November 2, 1994, appellant, through his counsel, 
appeared for the purpose of this "per se" hearing. Neither the 
arresting officer nor any witnesses appeared on behalf of the state 
at the informal hearing. The hearing officer received evidence, 
including, Inter alia, the officers1 reports, notice of citation, 
and an accident report dated October 8, 1994, (R. 47-50). A copy 
of the record of the division's proceedings, Findings and 
Conclusions is appended hereto in the appendix. 
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Pursuant to letter dated November 2, 1994, the Drivers License 
Division decided to "take no action" and did not suspend, deny or 
revoke appellant's driving privilege (R. 52). 
An Information was filed on or about December 12, 1994, in the 
trial court relating to the same offense which had come before the 
Drivers License Division, said Information alleging, inter alia, 
D.U.I, with injury, a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to § 41-6-44, 
U.C.A. and Failure to Stop at the Scene of an Injury Accident, 
pursuant to § 41-6-31, U.C.A., (R. 1-3). 
On or about February 21, 1995, appellant filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Count I of the Information (D.U.I, with injury) on the 
basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and Article One, Section 12, Utah State 
Constitution (R. 28-91). The state responded with a memorandum in 
opposition thereto on or about March 14, 1995 (R. 94-115). The 
issues were submitted on briefs without argument and the trial 
court denied appellant's Motion to Dismiss by Memorandum Decision 
on or about April 18, 1995 (R. 120-125). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decision of the Drivers License Division pursuant to § 53-
3-223, U.C.A., is the functional equivalent of a first prosecution 
for D.U.I, subjecting appellant to punishment. The appellant was 
thereby placed in jeopardy. A second prosecution for the same 
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offense under § 41-6-44, U.C.A., is therefore barred by the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article One, 
Section 12, Utah State Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
The hearing before of the Drivers License Division is the 
functional equivalent of a first prosecution. A 
subsequent trial for the same offense is a separate 
proceeding barred by the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article One, Section 12, Utah 
State Constitution. 
A. DOUBLE JEOPARDY GENERALLY 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
(reference to which hereinafter also includes Article One, Section 
12, Utah State Constitution) provides as follows: 
No . . .person (shall) be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb. . . . 
The so-called Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple 
punishments for the same offense. See, North Carolina v. Pierce, 
395 U.S. 711, 717, 23 L.Ed 2d, 656, 89 S. Ct., 2072 (1969). The 
text of the Amendment mentions only harm to "life or limb", however 
it is well settled that the Amendment covers imprisonment, monetary 
sanctions, and other penalties. See, e.g., Ex Parte Lang, 18 Wall 
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163, 21 L.Ed 872 (1874); United States v. Halper. 490 U.S. 435, 104 
L.Ed 2d 487, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989). 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a 
guaranty which applies to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Benton v. Maryland. 395 U.S. 784, 794, 23 L.Ed 2d 707, 
89 S. Ct. 2056 (1969). 
B. RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION REGARDING DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY. 
Until relatively recently, civil sanctions were not considered 
to be punishment for double jeopardy purposes. See, e.g., U.S. v. 
One Assortment of 89 Firearms. 465 U.S. 354 (1984). However, that 
position was clearly abandoned in United States v. Halyer, 490 U.S. 
435 (1989), which held that "the labels ?criminal1 and fcivil1 are 
not paramount in determining whether a sanction constitutes 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes": 
The notion of punishment, as we understand it, 
cuts across the division between the civil and 
the criminal law, and for the purposes of 
assessing whether a given sanction constitutes 
multiple punishment the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, we must follow the notion where it 
leads. 
U.S. v. Halver. 490 U.S. 447-448. 
The new test for determining whether a sanction, regardless of 
how it is labelled, civil, quasi-criminal, or otherwise, 
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constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, is stated as 
follows: 
A civil sanction that cannot fairly be said 
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather 
can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is 
punishment. . . . 
Id. at 448. 
The Supreme Court reasserted this holding four years later in 
the context of the Eighth Amendment's provision against excessive 
fines and forfeitures in Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 
(1993). Under Austin, to determine whether a forfeiture 
constitutes 'punishment1, the court looks at the entire scope of 
the statute which the government seeks to employ rather than to the 
characteristics of the specific property the government seeks to 
forfeit. 
Holding a contraband tax hearing to be separate and penal in 
nature, and therefor the subject of jeopardy, in Montana Department 
of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 128, 128 L.Ed 2d 767, (1994), 
the United States Supreme Court again reasserted that "the labels 
'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance". Kurth, 128 
L. Ed 2d at 777, citing United States v. Halver, supra. 
In Kurth Ranch the Supreme Court evaluated the entire scope of 
a Montana statute, which sought to tax the possession and storage 
of dangerous drugs and sustained dismissal of a subsequent "tax" 
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assessment for substantially the same misconduct on double jeopardy 
grounds. The holding in Kurth Ranch is that under certain 
circumstances civil penalties, in that case a tax on marijuana 
possession imposed by state statute, may constitute a punishment 
for purposes of analysis under the Fifth Amendment's Double 
Jeopardy Clause. In finding the civil assessment to be barred by 
a previous criminal trial on double jeopardy grounds, Kurth affirms 
Halyer and advances considerations under which a civil penalty may 
be characterized as punitive. 
The court stated in Kurth Ranch that criminal sanctions, civil 
penalties, civil forfeitures, and taxes all share certain aspects 
in common: some generate governmental revenues, all impose certain 
burdens on individuals (often physical), and deter certain 
behavior. "All of these sanctions are subject to constitutional 
restraints." Kurth, 128 L.Ed 2d at 778. 
One of these constraints, of course, is the issue of double 
jeopardy which is discussed thoroughly in the Kurth case. 
The Supreme Court' s analysis of the Montana forfeiture tax 
statute discusses several features of the Montana statute which set 
it apart from a mere revenue raising statute. The fact that one 
proceeding was denoted as 'civil' and the other 'criminal' was not 
among the factors considered. The court states, 
First, this so-called tax is conditioned on 
the commission of a crime. That condition is 
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"significant of penal and prohibitory intent 
rather than the gathering of revenue". . . . 
In this case the tax assessment not only 
hinges on the commission of a crime, it is 
also exacted only after the tax payor has been 
arrested for the precise conduct that gives 
rise to the tax obligation in the first place. 
Taxes imposed upon illegal activities are 
fundamentally different from taxes with a pure 
revenue raising purpose that are imposed 
despite their adverse effect on the taxed 
activity. But they differ as well from mixed 
motive taxes that governments impose both to 
deter a disfavored activity and to raise money 
(such as with the tax on cigarettes and 
tobacco). . . . These justifications vanish 
when the taxed activity is completely 
forbidden, for the legitimate revenue raising 
purpose that might support such a tax could be 
equally well served by increasing the fine 
imposed upon conviction. 
The (administrative) proceedings Montana 
initiated to collect a tax on the possession 
of drugs was the functional equivalent of a 
successive criminal prosecution that placed 
the Kurths in jeopardy a second time for "the 
same offense". Id. 114 S. Ct. at 1947-48. 
(emphasis added.) 
The considerations which the court in Kurth found to be 
relevant were (1) the high tax rate specified by the statute, (2) 
the statute's purpose of deterring unlawful activity, and the fact 
(3) that the tax is conditioned upon commission of crime, (4) is 
exacted only after taxpayer's arrest for conduct giving rise to tax 
obligation, and (5) is levied on goods, which the taxpayer no 
longer owns or possess. Under these conditions, the Montana tax on 
confiscated marijuana violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's 
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protection against successive punishments when imposed in 
proceeding subsequent to taxpayer's drug prosecution. 
The court in Kurth Ranch held that Montanaf s tax law was 
fairly characterized as a punishment. Applying the arguments made 
there to the circumstances presented here, it is obvious that a 
ninety days or one year driver's license suspension is intended at 
least in part to be a deterrent and penalty, i.e., a punishment for 
the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. It certainly is not 
solely remedial, as is required under Hal per to escape the 
characterization of punishment under the Fifth Amendment. Halver, 
490 U.S. 447-448. 
It is not claimed here that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars 
cumulative punishments imposed in a single proceeding. Punishments 
may be a combination of incarceration, fine, forfeiture, 
consecutive terms in prison, and consecutive terms of 
incarceration, etc. See, United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463 
(7th Cir. 1994) at 1464. Indeed, Utah State statutes provide that 
if a conviction arises for D.U.I., suspension for 90 days on a 
first offense is part of the automatic sanction which will be 
imposed by the division. Section 41-6-44, U.C.A. The division's 
decision letter to the appellant makes this clear (R. 52). 
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The problem is that there were separate proceedings, two 
hearings, each of which producing the potential for separate 
punishment for a single offense. 
As noted in Torres at 1465, 
But if as Kurth Ranch holds a civil proceeding 
to collect a monetary penalty for crime counts 
as an independent "jeopardy" it does not 
require much imagination to see the problem. 
Civil and criminal proceedings are not only 
docketed separately but also tried separately, 
and under the double jeopardy clause separate 
trials are anathema. 
Shortly after the decision in Kurth Ranch, supra, the Ninth 
Circuit applied its reasoning to civil forfeitures. See, U.S. v. 
McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Wash. 1994), holding that 
multiple punishments are permissible under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause only if imposed in the same proceeding and are barred if 
imposed in separate proceedings. See also. United States of 
America v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency. 33 F.3d 1210, (9th Cir. 
1994), holding that civil forfeiture proceedings constituted "a 
separate proceeding" resulting in convictions for the purpose of 
double jeopardy, that the civil forfeiture constituted "punishment" 
which triggered protections of double jeopardy and that criminal 
prosecution and civil forfeiture action based upon the same offense 
had to be brought in the same proceeding. 
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C. THE APPELLANT WAS PLACED IN JEOPARDY AT THE PRIOR HEARING 
BEFORE THE DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION. 
The Drivers License Division hearing with respect to the 
alleged driving under the influence of alcohol of the appellant is 
necessarily based upon the same facts and circumstances as would be 
the prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol in this 
case pursuant to § 41-6-44, U.C.A. (A copy of § 41-6-44, U.C.A. is 
contained in the appendix.) 
The statute under which the division attempted to suspend 
appellant's license is § 53-3-223, U.C.A. (See, letter to 
defendant, R. 45; a copy of § 53-3-223, U.C.A., is contained in the 
appendix.) 
Section 53-3-223, U.C.A., provides that if a peace officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be in violation of 
§ 41-6-44, U.C.A., he may request the defendant to take a 
chemical/alcohol test and, if the accused submits to the test, 
thereafter serve notice upon the person of intent to suspend his 
license and right to be heard, upon request therefor, within 30 
days before the division. After such hearing the division is 
authorized, upon a finding that a "...peace officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe the person was driving a motor vehicle in 
violation of §41-6-44..." ( § 53-3-223(6)(c)(i), U.C.A.), to suspend 
the person's license to drive provided as follows, 
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(7)(a). A first suspension, whether ordered or 
not challenged under this section, is for a 
period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day 
after the date of arrest, (b) A second or 
subsequent suspension under this subsection is 
for a period of one year, beginning on the 
30th day after the date of arrest. 53-3-223, 
U.C.A. 
The fact that no live witnesses appeared or testified at the 
hearing is of no consequence under Utah law. In Cordova v. 
Blackstock. 861 P.2d 449, (Utah App. 1993), the Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court's finding that it was not compelled to 
hold a trial de novo where the record of the division failed, in 
the trial court's opinion, to satisfy the "residuum of competent 
evidence" rule. The appellate court held that even though neither 
the officers nor the petitioner nor any other witness or person 
appeared on behalf of either side at the division's suspension 
hearing, the administrative agency, based upon evidence of the 
officer's report, test records, and affidavits, was competent to 
make a decision with respect to the suspension of Cordova's driving 
privileges. Cordova further held that the statutory scheme with 
respect to suspension or revocation of drivers' licenses provides 
for "informal adjudicative proceedings", reviewable by trial de 
novo only, and that the decision of the administrative agency based 
solely upon the arrest record and affidavits and documents 
submitted was competent to constitute basis for a decision, i.e., 
it was a "hearing". Therefore, the appellant was clearly placed in 
Page 15 
jeopardy of having his license suspended at the hearing before the 
division. 
It makes no difference that in this case the appellant was not 
"punished" as a result of the "per se" hearing. A finding of "no 
action" constitutes former jeopardy to the same extent as if the 
division had taken the appellant's license. This serves the 
underlying purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause - - protecting a 
person who has been acquitted from having to "run the gauntlet" a 
second time. Ashe v. Swenson. 397 U.S. 442, 446 (1970). 
D. SUSPENSION IS A PENALTY. 
The suspension of the driver's license is clearly a "penalty". 
Ninety days without a driver's license is obviously in the nature, 
at least to a substantial degree, of a sanction and a penalty. 
This is reinforced by the fact that a second such incident would 
result in suspension for the period of a full year as set forth in 
§ 53-3-223(7)(b), U.C.A. Greater punishment is applied if one 
fails to learn the lesson the first time. 
The sanctions imposed by § 41-6-44, U.C.A., (fine, 
imprisonment, etc. ) take place separately and wholly independent 
from § 53-3-223, U.C.A. The penalty under Title 53 is imposed 
regardless of the outcome at trial under Title 44. The driver's 
license suspension, however, is mandated under both sections. 
Section 41-6-44(12), U.C.A., states: 
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(b) The department shall subtract from any 
suspension or revocation period the number of 
days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223, if the 
previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction 
is based. 
The additional penalty of 90 days/one year license suspension as a 
consequence of violating § 41-6-44 as provided in section (12), 
lends weight to the argument that this is a punishment in addition 
to fines and jail time. 
The legislature's own statement applicable at the time of this 
offense that the "primary purpose" of the suspension statutes 
pursuant to Title 53 relating to D.U.I.fs is "protecting persons on 
highways by quickly removing from the highways those persons who 
have shown they are safety hazards", § 53-3-222, U.C.A., prior to 
1995 amendment, leaves latitude for the other obvious purposes, 
e.g., deterrence, retribution and punishment. Indeed, speaking to 
the issue of summary suspensions, the United States Supreme Court 
stated, !l[f]irst, the very existence of the summary sanction of the 
statute serves as a deterrent to drunken driving." Mackev v. 
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 at 18 (1979). 
If the 90 day/one year suspension were not a deterrent and 
punishment, there would be no reason, in practice, for a D.U.I, 
defendant to plead to the "lesser" charge of reckless driving, § 
41-6-45, U.C.A., which carries no license suspension penalty. 
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Since it is deemed a first offense on a second or subsequent 
conviction for D.U.I, pursuant to § 41-6-44(9)(b), the only 
advantage to such a reduced charge plea is avoidance of sanctions, 
often the same fine and/or jail time but without the 90 day/one 
year suspension. An optimum scenario for the D.U.I, defendant is 
to "win" the per se hearing and plead to an "alcohol related" 
reckless driving, thus preserving the driving privilege and 
escaping the substantial penalty of loss of the driving privilege, 
regardless of whether the court levies the same fine and/or jail as 
it would for a D.U.I. 
In this society where public transportation is either non-
existent or is, at best, inadequate and entire commercial shopping 
areas are located in suburbs surrounding our cities, we can no 
longer view a driver's license as merely a privilege which is given 
by the State and which is subject to revocation at any time. 
Having a driver's license has now taken on greater meaning. A 
driver's license is a substantial right which may not be deprived 
without due process. 
In enacting § 53-3-223, U.C.A., the legislature clearly 
intended at least in part to institute a penalty designed to deter 
drunk driving in contemplation of swift punishment. Section 53-3-
223, U.C.A., is, at the very least, partly punitive as it acts to 
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punish individual conduct, focusing on the culpability of a 
specific driver, rather than serving general remedial purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in Kurth the appellant asserts that 
the prosecution under Count I of the amended Information is the 
"functional equivalent of successive criminal prosecution" placing 
the defendant in jeopardy a second time "for the same offense." 
Kurth at 782. Clearly, § 53-3-227, U.C.A., provides for (1) a 
separate proceeding, and (2) a punishment. As such, it amounts to 
jeopardy. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of Article One, Section 12 of the 
Utah State Constitution should also be held to be violated by this 
same activity. The Utah State Supreme Court has specifically held 
that the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy affords a 
criminal defendant three separate protections by prohibiting (1) a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) 
multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Trafny. 799 
P.2d 704 (Utah 1990), citing State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 400 (Utah 
1987). 
The decision in Kurth Ranch requires Utah courts to revisit 
decisions such as Simms v. Tax Commission, 841 P. 2d 6 (Utah 1992), 
which incidently concedes that proceedings such as that for the 
Page 19 
revocation of an individual's driving privilege, is like a criminal 
proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against 
the law, and is "quasi criminal in character". 
The trial court's conclusion that the department's decision 
not to suspend the appellant's driver's license was not a prior 
separate proceeding subjecting him to punishment should be reversed 
and remanded with directions for the trial court to set aside the 
appellant's conviction and grant the appellant's motion on double 
jeopardy grounds. 
DATED this ***~T{ day of LJ^^^^^f , 1995. 
BULLEN 
:torney for Defendant/Appellant 
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APPENDIX A 
02 /0B/D5 11 : 3.3.. FAX 80.J...P 44 JLtJHiLs:eri4jc£nsfi. El 003 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 
P E R - S E 
N 0 T -A- D R O P 
Findings of Proceedings 
Date of 
Hearing 
November 0 2 , 9 k 
Time Set 
For Heanng Name and Address of Dnver 
9:00 AH 
Name and Address of Attorney 
TTArRrh^l RUIIPTL 
2749 P a r l e y s Way 
1 S a l t Lake Cxty, Utah 
Witness 
1 S y l v i a L. Stewart 
Witness 
| Marie Eklund 
84109 
Magna 
Magna 
A l l e n Garret t Tenwolde 
8689 West Edi th Dr. 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Heanng Officer 
Paul T. F i n l i n s o n 
Arresting Officer 
Dep^ Dwayne Anjewielrd 
Date of Birth DL Number 
11/14/1966 146388879 
Agency 
Salt Lake Sheriff 0 
Date of Arrest Witness 
October 08 ,1994 Dep. R. N i e l s e n 
Location of Hearing Witness 
Rose Park Driver L i c e n s e Div Dep. K. M a t t i n g l y 
OPENING STATEMENT 
This hearing is being conducted at the dnver's request in accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and 
( 3 53-3-223 U C A , following his/her arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs 
• 41-6-44 4 U C A , following his/her arrest for driving with measurable alcohol in the body. 
• 41-6-44 6 U.C A, following his/her arrest for dnving with measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a 
controlled substance in the body. 
The issues to be determined are If the peace officer had'grounds to believe the driver violated U C A 41-6-44/32A-
12-209/41-6-44 6, if the dnver was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and the test results 
All formalities required in court proceedings need not be used m this hearing However, the Division shall substantially 
comply with the fundamental rules of due process Sworn testimony will be taken and the parties may have witnesses 
testify. The driver may testify and may cross examine others who testify 
If the license is denied or suspended, the driver has the right within 30 days, to petition the proper court for an appeal 
heanna 
Those testifying will be sworn and the hearing shall proceed. 
< • * # # * * * * # * 
The following documents and information are part of the records for this hearing: 
The officer's report submitted in compliance with Utah Code Ann 53-3-223/41-6-44 4/41-6-44 6 
Notice and citation served by the officer of the Department's intent to deny/suspend and information on 
how to receive a heanng by the Department 
Heanng request made within ten days. 
Record of test results, if any Blood t e s t pending? 
Operational checklist of test instrument 
Yes 
Q 
Oc 
Dc 
a 
a 
No 
• 
a 
G 
• 
a 
DI-1006 
Rev 4-94 
V7 
02/06/9*5 11:34 FAX 801 964, Ut.DriverLicense 0)004 
Yes No 
Department of Public Safety affidavit that indicates the breath testing instrument was checked in 
accordance with standards set forth in 41-6-44 3 U C A. 
N/A 
Lg(one|H Other (i e., Documents and/or information received in behalf of the dnver and/or other evidence received 
which is made official record for the purpose of this hearing). 
Explain 1 . Acc iden t Report C# 94-L36130 on 10/0B/1994 by Dep. R. N i e l s e n . 2 Pages 
2 TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
%Supplemental Repor t . 3 Pages• 
1 Sworn testimony of officer 
Deputy Dwayne Anjewierden, SLCSO 
a. Following are the facts and conclusions presented by the peace officer leading to belief that the party had been 
u driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a 
»* combination of alcohol and any drug or with measurable alcohol, controlled substance or metabolite in the body. 
Deputy An/ jewieraen, SLCsCT, a i d n o t appear. 
b The driver was placed under arrest Yes C2 No D Charge(s) V i o l a t i o n o f 41-6-44 UCA 
The dnver was requested to submit to a chemical test Yes C3 No LJ 
c The dnver was advised pnor to the chemical test that the test results could result in denial/suspension of his/her 
driving privilege 
Yes D No D 
The dnver refused to submit to chemical test' Yes C l^ No D 
d Officer who administered chemical test was certified to do so Yes Q] No LJ 
e Proper Department procedure and rules were foliowed by the peace officer m the administration of the chemical 
test. 
Yes • No D 
(1) Evidence and/or information was received indicatina the test machine was Q was not Q properly working. 
(2)The dnver submitted to a chemical test as requested by a peace officer showing a test result of 
Pending? _% alcohol, 
LJ Controlled substance, 
CD Metabolite of a controlled substance. 
2. Testimony by witness officer or other witness(es) Name* None Taken 
2 F'fCY 
02/06/9-5 11:35 FAX 801 96 Ut.DrlverLicense @005 
3. Substance of testimony or evidence by driver or witness(es): Allen Garrett Tenwolde DOB: 11/14/1966 
The Driver didnot appear. No reason known. 
4. Substance of statement and/or questions by driver's legal counsel:
 I n B e h a l f . H e r s c h e l B u l l e n > A t t o r n e y 
Council did appear. 
PRESIDING OFFICER'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
A. The peace officer had reason to believe that the driver had • had not • violated.U.Q.Ar41 -6-44/32A-12-
209/41*6-44.6 and was arrested for the same. 
B. The driver was EH was not D advised of the possible denial/suspension/revocation of his/her driving privilege, 
C. After proper warning, the driver did D did not • submit to a chemical test. 
D. The chemical test was • was not D administered by an officer/medical person certified to do so. 
E. Proper procedures and standards were were not Q followed by the peace officer to insure the operation of 
the test machine to be reliable, with the results of p^n-r^g? %. 
F. Test results indicate O a controlled substance • metabolite of a controlled substance. 
3 
/ / /0 
02/OP,/95 u : as FAX 801 <K • 44 Ut.DriverLicense @006 
G, Departme it of Public Safety affidavit indicated the breath testing instrument used wasN0 was not Q reliable and 
in proper working order according to Department Standards (UCA 41-6-44.3). 
H. All procedures and requirements were (U were not • followed by the reporting officer pursuant to U.C.A. 53-3-
223. 41-6-44.4 or 41-6-44.6. (Explain what procedures were not followed, if any): 
I. Officer did • did not 0 appear 
Reasons (non-appearance): 
J. Additional findings of fact not covered above: 
Deputy Bwayi ie 'Ai i j ewie rden , SLCSO, d i d n o t a p p e a r . No r e a s o n known* 
CONCLUSIONS: 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ALL OF THE 
STATUTORY " PROVISIONS REQUIRED TO DENY/SUSPEND/REVOKE THE DRIVING 
PRIVILEGE WERE Q WERE NOT Q PROVIDED IN THIS CASE/ AND THE FOLLOWING 
DECISION IS RENDERED: 
a To deny, suspend or revoke the driving 
privilege by authority of Utah Code Ann. 
53-3-223, 41-6-44.4 or 41-6-44.6. 
0 Take No Action: 
Explain: Deputy Dwavne An iewie rden 
SLCSO. d i d n o t a p p e a r . #14 
Comments ly Presiding Officer. 
Reviewed bit Z& Title>^^< 
Presiding Officer: : / ^ tiJl^^^LJkniHS^/ 
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Each local authority shall pay for providing, training, and supervising 
schooNjrossing guards in accordance with this section. 
J53, 41-6-20.1, enacted by L. 
994, ch. 66, § 1; 1994, ch. 
History: C ? 
1992, ch. 91, § 
120, § 53. 
Amendment Notes^^- The 1994 amend-
ment by ch. 66} effective iHay 2, 1994, deleted 
"Before January 1, 1993" froS^the beginning of 
Subsection (2); deleted former Subsection 
(2)(b), adding comparable languagl^to the end 
of Subsection (2)(a); deleted former Subsection 
(3)(b), which provided for the maintenance of 
reduced speed school zones for state highways 
as required under Section 41-6-21; addea 
proviso at the end of Subsection (3)(b)(ii); addecl 
Subsection (3)(c); and made related changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 120, effective 
May 2, 1994, deleted "(a) Before January 1, 
: p d e -(2)(a)(ii) as Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(J 
leted former Subsection (2)(b), the suj^slance of 
which was incorporated into Subsection (2)(a) 
by the addition of "after written jrssurance by a 
local authority that the local* authority will 
comply with Subsections (3f and (4)"; redesig-
nated the subsections iri Subsection (3) and 
deleted former Subsemon (3)(b), which read 
"Notwithstanding Subsection (a)(ii)(B) the de-
partment shall ar'bvide for the maintenance of 
reduced speed^chool zones for state highways 
as requirecLtfhder Section 41-6-21"; substituted 
"Department of Transportation" for "Transpor-
^ation/^Commission" in Subsection (6); and 
$fe stylistic changes, 
i* section is set out as reconciled by the 
1993" at the beginning of Subsection (2); r e d e s - ^ O f f i c e ^ f Legislative Research and General 
ignated former Subsections (2)(a)(i) aptf Counsel 
TICLE 4 
41-6-29. 
/ ACCIDENTS 
/ 
Opei^rtor's duty at accident 
Pjmalty. 
Stop jrtaccident — 
y 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
C o r p u s de l ic t i . 
>4n order for the state to establish corpus 
^delicti, tfag stoii;.mjjffliwantinhlinh r iJ rlrnr nnri 
the scene was in fact the driver of the veSicle 
and not merely a passenger. State v. Hansel! 
• 007 PjPd 078 (Utnh f?t iW 
convincing evidence that the person who left m 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concen-
tration — Measurement of blood or breath alco-
hol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revoca-
tion of license — Penalties. 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
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(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circum-
stances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes any similar local 
ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work 
in a community-service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more 
than 50 hours. 
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the court may 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem 
condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation committed within six years 
of a prior violation under this section the court shall as part of any 
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecu-
tive hours nor more than 720 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work 
in a community-service work program for not less than 80 hours nor more 
than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two 
prior violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and 
(7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for 
violations committed after April 23, 1990. 
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(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 
2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain t reatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (a)(ii) the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail 
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sen-
tencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the 
program provides intensive care or inpatient t reatment and long-term 
closely supervised follow through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of the prior violations under this section is a third degree felony 
if at least three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 
23, 1990. 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine of not less than 
$1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours 
nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail 
sentence. 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing 
alternative to incarceration or community service if the program 
provides intensive care or inpatient t reatment and long-term closely 
supervised follow through after the treatment. 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall order the person to obtain t reatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section 
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked 
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person 
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, 
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after 
July 1, 1993, have been completed; 
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(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilita-
tion costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction 
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner 
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed 
after July 1, 1993. 
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, t reatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as 
a prior conviction under Subsection (10). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or 
t reatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or 
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction under 
Subsection (10), as the court would render in connection with applying 
respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements 
of Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section 
41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first, 
second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous convic-
tion under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior 
conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any 
community-based or other education program provided for in this section 
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services. 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to 
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted 
under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an 
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall 
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or 
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 as follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest 
to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for 
the record that there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation, the 
resulting conviction is a prior conviction for the purposes of Subsec-
tions (5), (6), and (7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-45 that is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and 
(7). 
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(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (1); and 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed 
within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation. 
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation 
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended 
under Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943, 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, 
§ l;1967,ch.88,§ 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, 
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, 
§ 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, 
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46, 
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29; 
1987, ch. 138, § 37;1987(lstS.S.),ch.8,§ 2; 
1988, ch. 17, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 16; 1990, 
ch .299 ,§ 1; 1991, ch. 147, § 1; 1993, ch. 168, 
§ 1; 1993, ch. 193, § 1; 1993, ch. 234, § 32; 
1994, ch. 159, § 1; 1994, ch. 263, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment by ch. 159, effective March 17, 1994, 
added Subsection (3)(a)(ii)(B), making related 
changes, and substituted "Section 53-3-223" for 
"41-2-130" in Subsection (12)(b). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 263, effective 
May 2, 1994, subdivided Subsection (12)(a), 
substituted "53-3-223" for "41-2-130" in Subsec-
tion (12)(b), and made stylistic changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Searches . 
In a prosecution for driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol, exigent circumstances, includ-
ing the concern of the police about the dissipa-
tion of blood alcohol and the possible loss or 
corruption of that evidence, justified a warrant-
less search of defendant's home. City of Orem v. 
Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
iQ-44.3.—Slandaids for chemical breatlrarariy* 
dence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Failure to comply with%tandards. 
Failure to comply fully witirk^andards estab-
lished by the Department of Publf&Safety does 
not necessarily make breath test evm^nce in-
admissible. It simply means that the foti 
tion and validity of the^^vTdence may not be 
presumed, but rathe&^ffat they will have to be 
established in orarer for the evidence to be 
admitted. S a h ^ a k e City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 
443 (UtabrfSfApp. 1993). 
41-6-44.6. Definitions — Drjp^Sg with any measurable 
controlled substaiice i ^ the body — Penalties — 
Arrest withou^warrant. 
(1) As used in this sec 
(a) "Controlled^iUbstance" means any substance scheduled under Sec-
tion 5 8 - 3 7 - V ^ 
(b) "Pr^utioner" has the same meaning as provided in Sec^tei 58-37-2. 
(cl^^rescribe" has the same meaning as provided in Section o8^37-2. 
J$5 "Prescription'* has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-
§ 41-6-44.10 
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41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol 
or drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning, 
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Ap-
peal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of 
test available — Who may give test — Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have 
given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine 
for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any 
drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are administered at the 
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have 
been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 
41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any 
other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to 
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select 
the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any 
specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a 
peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or 
administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit 
to the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested 
by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under 
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the 
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that 
a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the 
person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if the person does not 
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace 
officer be administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf 
of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver License 
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a 
motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of 
the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver 
License Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing 
before the Driver License Division. 
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(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by the 
Driver License Division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after 
the date of the arrest, tha t he had grounds to believe the arrested person 
had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under 
Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, while under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or 
while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a 
controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, 
and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under 
Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's 
intention to revoke his license under this section is entitled to a 
hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten 
days after the date of the arrest. 
(hi) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a 
hearing before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in 
the state is revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest 
for a period of: 
(A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction 
after July 1, 1993, under this section, Section 41-6-44.4, 41-6-
44.6, or 53-3-223, or a conviction after July 1,1993, under Section 
41-6-44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the Driver 
License Division, the hearing shall be documented and shall cover the 
issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a 
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, 
41-6-44.4, or 44-6-44.6; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test. 
(g) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized 
agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and 
papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace 
officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the 
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in 
Section 21-5-4. 
(h) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the 
person was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to 
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver 
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division 
shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah 
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction 
after July 1, 1993, under this section, Section 53-3-223, 41-6-44.4, 
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or 41-6-44.6, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section 
41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the 
person, in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), 
a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's 
driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed 
court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection 
tha t the revocation was improper. 
(i) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License 
Division under this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. 
Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering 
him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to 
not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or 
tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may 
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation 
does not apply to taking a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws 
a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason to 
believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility 
at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal 
liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests admin-
istered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, combination of 
alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
History: C. 1953,41-6-44.10, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 43; 1983, ch. 99, § 16; 1987, 
ch. 129, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 41; 1987, ch. 
161, § 143; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, §§ 3, 4; 
1988, ch. 148, § 1; 1990, ch. 30, § 21; 1992, 
ch. 78, § 3; 1993, ch. 161, § 2; 1993, ch. 193, 
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§ 2; 1993, ch. 205, § 3; 1993, ch. 234, § 35; 
1994, ch. 180, § 3. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6" 
twice in Subsection (l)(a) and once in Subsec-
tion (2)(d); substituted "Section 41-6-44.4, 41-6-
History: C. 1953, 41-6-46, enacted by L. 
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 45; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 1; 1991, ch. 44, 
§ 1; 1992, ch. 91, § 3; 1994, ch. 66, § 2; 1994, 
ch. 120, § 54. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1994 amend-
ment by ch. 66, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote 
Subsection (2)(a); deleted former Subsection 
(4), relating to the rule-making power of the 
Transportation Commission; and redesignated 
44.6, or 53-3-223" for "Section 41-2-130 or 41-6-
44.4" in Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B); inserted "41-6-
44.4, or 44-6-44.6" in Subsection (2)(f)(i); 
substituted "53-3-223" for "41-2-130 or" and 
inserted "or 41-6-44.6" in Subsection (2)(h) 
(i)(B); and added "or while having any measur-
able controlled substance or metabolite of a 
controlled substance in the person's body" at 
the end of Subsection (8). 
former Subsection (5) as Subsection (4). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 120, effective 
May 2, 1994, substituted "Subsection (4)" for 
"Subsection (5)" in Subsection (2); rewrote Sub-
section (2)(a); and also deleted former Subsec-
tion (4), redesignating former Subsection (5) as 
(4). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
ARTICLE 6 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate 
speeds at certain locations — Prima facie speed 
limits — Emergency power of the governor. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing, including when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, or 
highway conditions. 
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (4) and Sections 
41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful: 
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in 
Section 41-6-20.1; 
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; 
(c) 65 miles per hour on highways where this speed limit does not 
impair the ability of the state to qualify for federal highway funds; and 
(d) 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any speed in excess of the limits 
provided in Subsection (2) is prima facie evidence that the speed is not 
reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful. 
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change 
the speed limits on the highways of the state. 
§ 53-3-222 
53-3-222 PUBLIC SAFKTY 
53-3-222. Purpose of revocation or suspension for driving 
under the influence. 
The Legislature finds that a primary purpose of this title relating to suspen-
sion or revocation of a person's license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle for 
driving with a blood alcohol content above a certain level or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination of alcohol and any drug, or for 
refusing to take a chemical test as provided in Section 41-6-44.10, is protect-
ing persons on highways by quickly removing from the highways those per-
sons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 99, § 5; renumbered by L. 1987, 
ch. 137, § 29; C. 1953, 41-2-129; renumbered 
by L. 1993, ch. 234, § 101. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1993, renumbered this 
Cited in Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 
778 (Utah 1986). 
section, which formerly appeared as § 41-2-
129, substituted "drive" for "operate," deleted 
ending language defining safety hazards as the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or refusing to take 
a chemical test, and made stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
§ 53-3-223 
53-3-223. Chemical test for driving under the influence — 
Temporary license — Hearing and decision — 
Suspension and fee — Judicial review, 
(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person may 
be violating or has violated Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the operation of a 
vehicle with a certain blood or breath alcohol concentration and driving 
under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or combination of a drug and 
alcohol or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite 
of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 
41-6-44.6, the peace officer may, in connection with arresting the person, 
request that the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be adminis-
tered in compliance with the standards under Section 41-6-44.10. 
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6-44 includes any similar 
local ordinance adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1). 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission 
to a chemical test that a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 or 
41-6-44.6 shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render 
the person incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in suspension 
or revocation of the person's license to drive a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a 
blood or breath alcohol content in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6, or 
if the officer makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the 
person is otherwise in violation of Section 41-6-44, the officer directing 
administration of the test or making the determination shall serve on the 
person, on behalf of the division, immediate notice of the division's intention to 
suspend the person's license to drive a motor vehicle. 
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(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of the division he 
shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the driver; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days; 
and 
(iii) supply to the driver, on a form to be approved by the division, 
basic information regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before 
the division. 
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the 
division, serve also as the temporary license certificate. 
(5) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the division within five 
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice: 
(a) the person's license certificate; 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the division indicating the 
chemical test results, if any; and 
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that the person has 
violated Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.6. 
(6) (a) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The 
request to be heard shall be made within ten days of the date of the arrest. 
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the division in the county in which 
the arrest occurred, unless the division and the person agree that the 
hearing may be held in some other county. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 
41-6-44.6; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and 
papers; 
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace 
officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the 
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in 
Section 21-5-4. 
(e) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing. 
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before any number of the 
members of the division is as valid as if made after a hearing before the 
full membership of the division. 
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's 
license to drive a motor vehicle is suspended or not. 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held fails to appear before the 
division as required in the notice, the division shall order whether the 
person's license to drive a motor vehicle is suspended or not. 
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this 
subsection, is for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the 
date of the arrest. 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection is for a 
period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest. 
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(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee 
imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14) for driving under the influence, a 
fee under Section 53-3-105 to cover administrative costs, which shall be 
paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated. This fee shall be 
cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed division hearing or court 
decision that the suspension was not proper. 
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under 
this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after the suspension for 
a hearing on the mat ter which, if held, is governed by Section 53-3-224. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 99, § 6; 1987, ch. 129, § 2; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 30; 1990, ch. 30, 
§ 6; 1992, ch. 21, § 1; 1993, ch. 205, § 2; C. 
1953, 41-2-130; renumbered by L. 1993, ch. 
234, § 102; 1994, ch. 180, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6" 
in Subsection (l)(a); inserted "or 41-6-44.6" in 
Subsections (2), (3), (5)(d), and (6)(c)(i); and 
inserted "21-5-4" in Subsection (6)(d)(ii). 
i^ 3«3 227:—Driving a niuloi vehicle prohibited while \w 
\. cense denied, suspended, disqualified, or Jte-
X^ voked — Penalties. jT 
(1) ANoerson whose license has been denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked u ^ e r this chapter or under the laws of the state in whioJfhis license 
was i s suedand who drives any motor vehicle upon the highwa^C of this state 
while tha t l ^ n s e is denied, suspended, disqualified, or invoked shall be 
punished as proSdded in this section. JF 
(2) A person coraricted of a violation of Subsection (1), amer than a violation 
specified in Subsecu^n (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeano^whose conviction under 
Subsection (1) is b a ^ d on his driving a motor^ehicle while his license is 
suspended, disqualifieH^or revoked for: jp 
(i) a refusal to s u W i t to a chemic^Cest under Section 41-6-44.10; 
(ii) a violation of S^t ion 41-6-44iF 
(iii) a violation of a looal ordinance that complies with the require-
ments of Section 41-6-43;^. j r 
(iv) a violation of Section j ^ 6 - 4 4 . 6 ; 
(v) a violation of Sectior^oN^207; 
(vi) a criminal actionJj$at theVerson plead guilty to as a result of 
a plea bargain after ha|ffng been orteinally charged with violating one 
or more of the sections or ordinancea^nder this subsection; 
(vii) a r evoca t i i ^o r suspension wBjch has been extended under 
Subsection 53-&K20 (2); or X 
(viii) wheij^Iisqualification is the resuKj)f driving a commercial 
motor vetj^te while the person's CDL is cUgqualified, suspended, 
canceled^or revoked under Subsection 53-3-4 A Q ) . 
(b) A pggson is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whoi^e conviction under 
Subsection (1) is based upon his driving a motor vehicle^/hile his license 
is sus^fnded, disqualified, or revoked in his state of licelasure for viola-
tioru^orresponding to the violations listed in Subsection (9i 
Jt) A fine imposed under this subsection shall be at least tfttemaximum 
Jme for a class C misdemeanor under Section 76-3-301. X 
listory: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 29; C. 1943, 
57-4-32; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 8; 1983, ch. 183, 
§ 27; C. 1953, 41-2-28; renumbere\by L. 
1987, ch. 137, § 36; 1989, ch. 209, § 20^989, 
